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NOTES
CALIFORNIA FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN ASS'N v.
GUERRA: STATE GUARANTEE OF PREGNANCY
DISABILITY LEAVE CONFRONTS TITLE VII OF
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
Women today compose almost one half of the labor force.' Many women
work outside the home because their income contribution is essential to their
own or their family's well being.2 When the majority of these female em-
ployees become pregnant,3 however, their job status is critically jeopardized.
Pregnancy requires time off from work which includes, at a minimum, the
actual disability period.4 Unfortunately, only forty percent of working wo-
men get sufficient disability leave at the time of childbirth.' The use of sick
leave and earned vacation time by others may result in less than one month
away from the job. The remaining pregnant employees are even less fortu-
nate. Because pregnancy inevitably requires time off from work, many wo-
men must choose between having a job and bearing a child.6
Congress addressed this problem by amending Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 to include a prohibition against discrimination on the
1. L.A. Times, June 24, 1984, § 8 at 6, col. 1.
2. Women's Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Twenty Facts on Women Workers 2 no. 9
(1984).
3. Eighty percent of working women are in their childbearing years (ages 15 to 45) and
ninety-three percent of these will have a child during their work life. S. KAMERMAN, MATER-
NITY AND PARENTAL BENEFITS AND LEAVES, AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW (1980), cited in
Kreiger & Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal Treatment, Positive Action and the
Meaning of Women's Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE 513, 518-519 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
Krieger].
4. A six-week disability leave is generally necessary for a woman to recuperate after
childbirth. H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 4753 [hereinafter cited as House Report].
5. (new cite required. Cite directly to survey or find substitute]
6. " '[E]ight million women of childbearing age-or twenty-five percent of the women
who work twenty hours a week, face the threat of unemployment if they choose to have a baby,
because of company disability policies that don't return them to the same-or at least, a simi-
lar-job,' charges Sheila B. Kamerman in her book Maternity Policies and Working Women."
Pregnancy Leave - Is There Sufficient Legal Protection, INDUSTRY WEEK, April 16, 1984, at
33, col. 1.
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basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.7 Many compa-
nies interpret the Act to mean that they are restricted only from treating
pregnant employees differently from others, and therefore may offer female
employees the same leave for pregnancy disability which they grant to all
employees for other disabilities. This equal treatment approach rests on the
assumption that men and women are similarly situated with respect to em-
ployment, and if treated equally, will be able to compete on the same level.'
Conversely, some state legislatures construe Title VII in light of its pur-
pose: to guarantee equal opportunity in employment.9 One such law, the
California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), expands upon the
Title VII mandate and requires employers to provide up to four months dis-
ability leave for pregnant employees." ° The constitutionality of this statute
was challenged in the 1984 case, California Federal Savings and Loan Associ-
ation v. Guerra."1
7. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e17 (1976 and
Supp. IV 1980), guarantees women equal opportunity in the work force. Congress amended
the terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" to include on the basis of pregnancy,
childbirth or related medical conditions. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. IV 1980), provides in pertinent part: "women affected by pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related
purposes . . . as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to
work .. "
8. Proponents of the Equal Treatment Analysis believe that any kind of "special" or
"preferential" benefits given to women will only perpetuate the stereotypes they already suffer
in employment. See, e.g., L.A. Times, March 21, 1984, at A3, col. I (quoting Mayor Diane
Feinstein on the subject): "What we women have been saying all along is we want to be
treated equally. Now we have to put our money where our mouth is." Mayor Feinstein cau-
tioned against the establishment of "a special group of workers that in essence is pregnant
women and new mothers." Id. The basis of her stance was that "the work market should not
have to accommodate itself to women having children." Id.
9. "The elimination of discrimination based on pregnancy in these employment practices
in addition to disability and medical benefits will go a long way toward providing equal em-
ployment opportunities for women, the goal of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 7, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4755.
States using an approach contrary to equal treatment, often termed special treatment, are
California, Montana, and Connecticut. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12945 (West 1980); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 39-7-203 (1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-6 (West 1982).
10. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12945(b)(2) (West 1980) provides in relevant part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice unless based upon a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification...
(b) for any employer to refuse to allow a female employee affected by pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions either ...
(2) to take a leave on account of pregnancy for a reasonable period of time; pro-
vided, such period shall not exceed four months . . . Reasonable period of time
means that period during which the female employee is disabled on account of preg-
nancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.
11. 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 562 (C.D. Cal. 1984), rev'd, 758 F.2d 390 (9th Cir.
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Judge Emmanuel Real, presiding in the federal district court in California,
held that Title VII preempts Section 12945(b)(2) of the California Govern-
ment Code. Judge Real found that the state law was inconsistent with the
purpose of Title VII's Pregnancy Discrimination Amendment, and that it
conflicted with Title VII's mandate because an employer could not comply
with both the federal and the state laws simultaneously. 2 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Title VII not
only permits, but advocates state laws which further equalize the employ-
ment opportunities of pregnant women with those of others not disabled by
pregnancy. '
3
This note begins with a brief overview of the judicial standards applicable
to a preemption issue under the United States Constitution's Supremacy
Clause. It then lays a foundation for an examination of the conflict between
the Pregnancy Discrimination Amendment to Title VII and California Gov-
ernment Code § 12945(b)(2) which provides affirmative guarantees to preg-
nant employees. The note analyzes the validity of this conflict and concludes
that the state and federal laws are compatible because both require the same
protections for pregnant employees.
I. JUDICIAL STANDARDS APPLIED UNDER THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that the
Constitution and the laws passed by Congress are supreme.' 4 In 1824 Chief
Justice Marshall proclaimed that a state law which contradicts or interferes
with a law passed by Congress pursuant to its powers is inoperative under
the Supremacy Clause. 5 Justice Black enunciated the Hines test in 1941,
under which a state law is invalid if it "stands as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." 16
1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. - (1986) [hereinafter, both opinions will be cited as California
Federal ].
12. Id. at 568.
13. California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 758 F.2d 390, 396 (9th Cir. 1985).
14. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pur-
suance thereof;. . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding.
15. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 210-11 (1824). Even before Gibbons, the
Supreme Court acknowledged that "the states have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to
retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control the operations of the constitutional laws
enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the general government."
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 317 (1819).
16. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). See also Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank,
161 U.S. 275, 283 (1896), where the Supreme Court declared that a state law would be invalid
19861
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To make this determination the court must inquire to what extent Congress
intended to foreclose state regulation in a particular area.1 7 If Congress did
not preclude state action, the court, after determining the purpose of the
federal statute, decides if the state scheme of regulation actually controverts
the federal purpose. 8 Finally, a state statute will not withstand scrutiny
where enforcement of its provisions prevents compliance with federal law.' 9
A. Congressional Intent to Preempt State Law
Congress may bar state action on a particular problem by manifesting its
intent to preempt state laws in the statutory language.20 Absent this express
intent, the court may begin its search for an implied intent with the pre-
sumption that "the historic powers of the states were not to be superseded by
the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Con-
gress."'" Circumstances which may rebut this presumption exist (1) where
the thoroughness of the federal scheme implies that there is no room for
state augmentation,22 (2) when Congress passes legislation in a field where
the federal interest is prevalent,2 3 or (3) where preemption is implicit from
the particular goal of the law and the claims or rights it prescribes.24
The Supreme Court, considering Title VII's degree of supremacy over
state laws, concluded that Title VII was designed to "supplement rather
than supplant" prohibitions against employment discrimination.2  The evi-
if it "either frustrates the purpose of the national legislation or impairs the efficiency of those
agencies of the federal government to discharge the duties, for the performance of which they
were created."
17. Justice Black noted that where the federal government, "in the exercise of its dele-
gated powers has enacted a complete scheme of regulation. . ., states cannot, inconsistently
with the purpose of Congress, conflict or interfere with, curtail or complement the federal law,
or enforce additional or auxilliary regulations." Hines 312 U.S. at 66-67.
18. See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
19. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
20. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State
Energy Resources Conservation and Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
21. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 461 U.S. at 193; Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
218, 230 (1947); Jones 430 U.S. at 525; Santa Monica Airport Ass'n v. City of Santa Monica,
659 F.2d 100, 103 (9th Cir. 1981). See also Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504
(1978), where the Court recognized that because Congress rarely states its intention to preempt
state legislation in express terms, the Court tends to sustain the local regulation as long as it
does not conflict with the federal law.
22. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 250 U.S. 566, 568 (1919); Cloverleaf
Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942).
23. Hines, 312 U.S. 52.
24. Southern Ry. Co. v. R.R. Comm'n of Indiana, 236 U.S. 439 (1915); New York Cen-
tral R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147 (1917). See also Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la
Cuesta, 458 U.S. 140, 152-153 (1982).
25. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48-49 (1974). Accord Johnson v.
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dence supports this conclusion. Congress included no express statement of
an intent to preempt in the language of Title VII. Rather, the drafters in-
serted a broad anti-preemption provision which applies to the Act in its en-
tirety.2 6 An amendment to Title VII dubbing it the exclusive remedy for
illegal employment practices was defeated in the Senate.27 Instead, a vague
provision authorizing some state action was included in Title VII, but it of-
fers little guidance in determining the limits of that activity. Title 42, Sec-
tion 2000e-7 of the U.S. Code provides:
Nothing in this title shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any per-
sons from any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by
any present or future law of any state or political subdivision of a
state, other than any such law which purports to require or permit
the doing of any act which would be an unlawful employment
practice under this title.28
Senator Joseph Clark, a sponsor of the bill, proffered the view that Congress
did not intend to affect an individual's rights under state statutes. 29 Accord-
ingly, the Senate committee considering the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972, recognized that the new remedial scheme of Title VII would
not affect protection afforded by other laws.3° Plainly, there is no implica-
tion from Congress that Title VII is designed to preempt state prohibitions
on employment discrimination.
The Pregnancy Discrimination Amendment adds no substantive provi-
sions to Title VII. It only includes pregnancy discrmination in the definition
of sex discrimination. 31 The accompanying House Report specifically ac-
knowledged that the Pregnancy Discrimination Amendment would not"ef-
Railway Express Agency Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975). "Despite Title VII's range and its design
as a comprehensive solution for the problem of invidious discrimination in employment, the
aggrieved individual clearly is not deprived of other remedies he possesses and is not limited to
Title VII in his search for relief." Id. at 459.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4 (1982). ("Nothing contained in any title of this Act shall be
construed as indicating an intent on the part of Congress to occupy the field in which any such
title operates to the exclusion of State laws on the same subject matter, nor shall any provision
of this Act be construed as invalidating any provision of State law unless such provision is
inconsistent with any of the purposes of this Act, or any provision thereof.")
27. 110 CONG. REC. 13,650-13,652 (1964).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1982).
29. 110 CONG. REC. 7,207 (1964).
30. S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1971). The Equal Employment Opportunity
Act encapsulates the 1972 Amendments to Title VII.
31. HouSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 3, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 4751 ("H.R. 6075 was introduced to change the definition of sex discrimination in Title VII
to reflect the common-sense view and to ensure that working women are protected against all
forms of employment discrimination based on sex.") See also id. at 4, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4752.
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fect changes in practices, costs, or benefits beyond those intended by Title
VII." 2 In the same report, the Committee surveyed contemporary legal
treatment of pregnancy through state disability insurance laws and state fair
employment practice laws, and through judicial interpretations and agency
regulations of relevant local legislation.33 A United States district court con-
cluded in its decision dealing with preemption of the Montana Maternity
Leave Act (MMLA) that "[w]hen Congress passed Title VII and the Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act, it did not intend to completely occupy the field of
employment discrimination to the exclusion of state laws.",34 Absent a find-
ing of this express or implied intent to peempt, a state law may still be inva-
lid under the Supremacy Clause if it conflicts with the federal act.
B. Conflict of State Law with the Purpose and Execution of Title VII
Conflict between state and federal laws may occur in two ways: (1) where
the local law attempts to accomplish a goal contrary to the design of the
federal statute;35 and (2) where compliance with both federal and state laws
is a practical impossibility.3 6 In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., where the Court
rejected an employer's right to use tests unrelated to job performance as a
condition of employment, the Supreme Court determined the goal of Title
VII to be to "achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove bar-
riers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group. . ... 37
The statutory language of Title VII verifies this determination. Title VII
provides that it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer...
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment op-
portunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. (Emphasis added)
32. Id. at 3, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4751.
33. Id. at 10, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4758. See also 123
CONG. REC. 29,648 (1977); S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 3 (1977).
34. Miller-Wohl Co. v. Commissioner of Labor and Industry, 515 F. Supp. 1264, 1267
(D. Mont. 1981), vacated, 685 F.2d 1088 (9th Cir. 1982).
35. Hines, 312 U.S. at 67; Jone4 430 U.S. at 540-41.
36. Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
37. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971). Those cases following Griggs
have remained committed to an equivalent interpretation of the purpose behind Title VII. See,
e.g., Alexander, 415 U.S. at 44; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973);
Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976); Hishon v. King &
Spalding, 104 S. Ct. 2229, 2234, n.7 (1984).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (The subheading for Title VII is
"equal [sic] Employment Opportunities"); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (The federal agency given the
duty to enforce Title VII is the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission).
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An individual is deprived of equal employment opportunity when an em-
ployer, with discriminatory motive, treats that individual differently from
another because of his race, color, religion, sex or national origin.39 This
theory is termed "disparate treatment." Based on the goal of Title VII, the
Griggs Court announced that the Act also prohibits "practices that are fair
in form, but discriminatory in operation."'' Under this second theory,
coined "disparate impact," the evidentiary burden is initially on the claimant
to establish a prima facie case by showing that an employment policy which
is facially neutral in its treatment of different groups, tends to deny one
group more opportunities than another. The burden then shifts to the em-
ployer to justify the policy by showing a business necessity.4
In establishing a prima facie case under the disparate impact theory, the
Court determined in Dothard v. Rawlinson that a claimant need not proffer
comparative statistics of actual employees or applicants denied employment
due to the employer's neutral policies.4 2 Instead, a claimant may present
statistics from the total labor force to evidence a claim of employment dis-
crimination.43 Responding to Dothard, the Fourth Circuit stated that when
these statistics cannot reasonably be questioned, courts will take judicial no-
tice that a specific employment practice does produce a disparate impact."
The Supreme Court in Dothard also affirmed the district court's power to
remedy a situation of disparate impact by ordering the employer to refrain
from applying a facially neutral policy to those individuals adversely
affected.4 5
In summary, a victim of employment discrimination can obtain relief by
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
40. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
41. See International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-66
n. 15 (1977) (The Court emphasized the distinction between disparate treatment and disparate
impact).
42. 433 U.S. 321, 330 (1977).
43. Id. The Court recognized that statistics covering only actual applicants or employees
would not reflect those individuals who did not try for the position because the discriminatory
policy deterred them from the start. Id. at 330. See, e.g., id at 329-30 (The Court accepted
statistics showing that the employer's height and weight requirements disqualified 41.13 per-
cent of women in the labor force but fewer than one percent of the men); Griggs, 401 U.S. at
430, n.6 (Statistics validating that substantially fewer blacks graduated from high school were
utilized in Griggs); Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401, 403 (C.D. Cal. 1970),
afd in pertinent part, 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972) (Court allowed claimant to support a claim
of disparate impact on blacks due to a policy against hiring persons with arrest records, with
statistics that blacks were arrested in greater percentages than whites).
44. Mitchell v. Board of Trustees, 599 F.2d 582, 585 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 965
(1979).
45. Mieth v. Dothard, 418 F. Supp. 1169, 1185 (M.D. Ala. 1976) affd in pertinent part,
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 (1977).
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proving that an employer has treated him differently from others on a basis
protected by Title VII.46 Alternatively, the employee may show that be-
cause a particular employment practice impacts more harshly on one group
than another, it denies him equal employment opportunity. This latter de-
termination is made by judicial examination of the employer's policy and the
necessities of the employer's business operation. The use of a disparate im-
pact analysis is fundamental in any situation where the discrimination is not
pronounced.47
1. Supreme Court Interpretation of Pregnancy Discrimination Under
Title VII
Disparate impact analysis is the only recourse when a classification is not
specifically protected by Title VII. In the 1976 case of General Electric Co.
v. Gilbert, the Supreme Court concluded that General Electric's (G.E.) disa-
bility insurance plan, which excluded coverage for pregnancy-related disabil-
ities, was nondiscriminatory on its face because it treated equally those
disabilities which male and female employees shared.48 The Court reasoned
that when Congress made it unlawful for an employer to discriminate "be-
cause of" or "on the basis of sex," those phrases bore no implication of an
intent to prohibit discrimination because of or on the basis of pregnancy.49
Hence, disparate treatment of the nonpregnant and the pregnant was not
prohibited by Title VII. The Gilbert decision contradicted the latest guide-
lines from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and
the six federal courts of appeal that had considered the issue.50 However,
the majority in Gilbert did recognize that the disability plan would constitute
a prima facie violation of Title VII if the exclusion of certain risks in the plan
impacted more harshly upon women than men.51 The Court summarily
concluded that the claimants had not proven any such disparate impact.
52
There was a vigorous dissent by Justice Brennan with whom Justice Mar-
46. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 333 ("[I]t is impermissible under Title VII to refuse to hire an
individual woman or man on the basis of stereotyped characterizations of the sexes .... .
The Court cited agreement from the federal courts and the EEOC. Id. at 333-34 n.17.
47. Recent cases emphasizing the applicability of a disparate impact analysis in Title VII
discrimination suits include: Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982); Guardians
Ass'n v. Civil Service Commission, 463 U.S. 582 (1983); EEOC v. Borden's Inc., 724 F.2d
1390 (9th Cir. 1984).
48. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
49. Id. at 145.
50. Id. at 146-47 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also HousE REPORT, supra note 4, at 2,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4750.
51. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 136-37.
52. Id. at 138. The majority concluded, "As there is no proof that the package is in fact
worth more to men than to women, it is impossible to find any gender-based discrimination
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shall concurred. Justice Brennan disagreed with the majority's simplifica-
tion of the term "sex" as used in Title VII and directed attention to the
Court's high standard of deference typically given to the EEOC's interpreta-
tions.53 Additionally, the dissent suggested that G.E.'s insurance package
did have a disparate impact on women because, while all male-specific and
most female-specific disabilities were covered, pregnancy, the most prevalent
disability unique to female employees, was excluded. 4 Justice Brennan, sus-
pecting that the underlying reasons why benefits for pregnancy were not in-
cluded in G.E.'s insurance package rested in a stereotypical view that
women play only a minor role in the labor force, urged a return to an analy-
sis which would flow from the social policies and objectives of Title VII.
In 1977 two more employer policies related to pregnancy reached the
Supreme Court in Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty. 56 In the first the Court held
that a plan which denied an employee returning from pregnancy disability
leave her seniority status, although neutral in its treatment of male and fe-
male employees, violated Title VII because it had a disparate impact on wo-
men.5 7 While the claimant in Satty was on maternity leave, her position was
eliminated due to a bona fide reduction in the size of her department. Upon
her return, the employer placed her in a temporary position at a lower sal-
ary. Seeking job advancement, the employee applied for three different per-
manent positions. Had she been permitted to retain the seniority she
accumulated before commencing pregnancy disability leave, she would have
received one of the job openings.58 Instead, the positions were given to em-
ployees who began work while the claimant was on leave. Eventually the
temporary position terminated, leaving the claimant unemployed. From
these facts the Court recognized that because only women get pregnant, they
suffer a burden from a denial of seniority that men will never suffer.59
effect in the scheme simply because women disabled as a result of pregnancy do not receive
benefits."
53. Id. at 156 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For support, Justice Brennan cited to Albermarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433-34; Phillips v. Martin
Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring).
54. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 155 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 160 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
56. 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 139.
59. Id. at 142. The Court could not dismiss that the "policy denied [claimant] specific
employment opportunities that she otherwise would have obtained" as easily as it did in Gil-
bert. The Court was willing to admit that "[e]ven if [claimant] had ultimately been able to
regain a permanent position with petitioner, she would have felt the effects of a lower seniority
level, with its attendant relegation to less desirable and lower paying jobs, for the remainder of
her career with petitioner." Id. at 141.
1986]
336 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 2:327
Therefore, a policy which denies women seniority upon return from preg-
nancy disability leave is a violation of Title VII's prohibition against dispa-
rate impact discrimination.
As to the second policy, under which the employees received compensa-
tion for time lost due to all non-job-related disabilities except pregnancy, the
Court reaffirmed its analysis from Gilbert. ' The employer was innocent of
disparate treatment because the policy applied equally to men and women.
61
Moreover, the employer was innocent of disparate impact discrimination be-
cause, in the Court's view, exclusion of pregnancy from a sick leave compen-
sation program (Satty), like exclusion of pregnancy from a disability
insurance plan (Gilbert), does not deprive an individual of employment
opportunity. 2
These cases made it clear that an employer could treat pregnancy differ-
ently under employee benefit plans without committing a per se violation of
Title VII. The Court was inconsistent, though, as to when it would find
disparate impact. According to its holdings in Gilbert and Satty, women
who become pregnant suffer substantial hardship when they are denied their
seniority, but not when they are burdened with paying their medical bills
and living expenses while on pregnancy disability leave. In response to this
confusion, Congress enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) with
the expectation that "[bly making it clear that distinctions based on preg-
nancy are per se violations of Title VII, the bill would eliminate the need in
most instances to rely on the impact approach, and thus would obviate the
difficulties in applying the distinctions created in Satty. 3
2. Purpose and Execution of PDA Under a Disparate Impact Theory
Congress chose to amend Title VII by simply broadening the definition of
sex to include pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions.6" In
60. Id. at 144-45.
61. Id. at 140, 143. Quoting Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 136, the Satty Court acknowledged that
pregnancy is a disability unique to women, but would not look beyond the fact that men and
women both receive compensation for absence from work due to disabilities other than preg-
nancy and both retain job seniority while on leave for these non-job-related disabilities. Id.
62. Id.
63. HousE REPORT, supra note 4, at 3, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. AND AD.
NEWS at 4751.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). With the new definition of sex inserted into § 2000e-2, Title VII
provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's... [pregnancy] . . .; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
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recommending the revised law for passage, the Education and Labor Com-
mittee expressed the hope that the PDA would effectively "encourage wo-
men to remain in the work force during and after pregnancy."' 65 The
Amendment affords protection for conditions of employment previously
covered by Title VII including hiring, reinstatement, termination, disability
benefits, sick leave, medical benefits, and seniority.66 The committee specifi-
cally stated that "[p]regnancy-based discrimination will be subject to the
same scrutiny on the same terms as other acts of discrimination proscribed
in the existing statute.",67 Unquestionably, under the PDA treating women
differently from men because of pregnancy is per se a violation of Title VII.68
In addition to prohibiting disparate treatment, Title VII also forbids those
employment "practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in operation"
(disparate impact).69 Logic impels the conclusion that the disparate impact
theory is, therefore, applicable to discrimination on the basis of pregnancy.
Furthermore, the goal of Title VII in conjunction with the PDA, the elimi-
nation of pregnancy discrimination to achieve equal employment opportu-
nity, cannot be achieved without the use of a disparate impact analysis.
Treating an employee affected by pregnancy the same as other disabled
employees guarantees equal employment opportunity to the pregnant em-
ployee only when the employer's policies provide adequate time off from
work. In Abraham v. Graphic Arts International Union, the union as em-
ployer allowed ten days disability leave to all individuals employed on a par-
ticular project.70 Laurie Abraham, an employee who needed pregnancy
disability leave of more than ten days,7 ' could not have argued her case
against the union under a disparate treatment analysis because the ten-day
leave policy applied equally to both men and women.7 2 The United States
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment op-
portunities or otherwise adversely affect [her] status as an employee, because of such
individual's. . . [pregnancy] ....
65. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 12, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. AND AD.
NEWS at 4760.
66. Id. at 4, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. AND AD. NEWS at 4753.
67. Id., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. AND AD. NEWS at 4752.
68. Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983). See
also Miller-Wohl Co. v. Comm'r of Labor & Industry, 515 F. Supp. 1264, 1267 (D. Mont.
1981), vacated without op., 605 F.2d 1088 (9th Cir. 1982); Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank of
Dallas, 505 F. Supp. 224, 390 (N.D. Texas 1980); Fancher v. Veterans Admin. Medical
Center, 507 F. Supp. 124, 128 (E.D. Ark. 1981); Abraham v. Graphic Arts Int'l Union, 660
F.2d 811, 819 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
69. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
70. Abraham v. Graphic Arts International Union, 660 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
71. See supra note 4.
72. A disparate treatment argument was also of no use to claimants in a Texas case where
the employer denied accrual of seniority to any employee during leave, whatever the disability.
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Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in recognizing the
Title VII violation under a disparate impact analysis, stated "[i]n short,
[that] the ten day absolute ceiling on disability leave portended a drastic
effect on women employees of childbearing age-an impact no male would
ever encounter."73 In future situations like the one in Abraham, courts will
have to make case by case determinations of which employment practices,
although facially neutral, have a disparate impact on women. To avoid this
tedious process, a few state legislatures which have reached the conclusion
that inadequate pregnancy disability leave does have a disparate impact on
women, have incorporated this finding into law.74
Based on such a determination, the Montana Maternity Leave Act pro-
vides that it is unlawful for an employer to refuse a woman employee a rea-
sonable leave during the period of her pregnancy disability. 5 This law was
challenged in Miller-Wohl Co. v. Commissioner of Labor & Industry.7 6
Miller-Wohl's policy denied disability leave to any employee with less than
one year seniority, and therefore violated the MMLA as to certain pregnant
employees. The company defended on the ground that the MMLA con-
flicted with Title VII because it required the employer to grant a reasonable
pregnancy disability leave regardless of seniority, thereby treating men dif-
ferently from women.77 The court saw no conflict, and suggested that the
company could comply with the MMLA and Title VII by extending reason-
able absences to new employees, both female and male, who missed work
due to any sickness or disability.78 The court also noted, based on the
Supreme Court ruling in Satty, that the employer's policy, as it stood, would
violate Title VII if shown to have a disparate impact on women.79
The Miller-Wohl Company appealed the district court's ruling to the
Ninth Circuit. ° That court summarily dismissed the case based on a finding
In that suit the court concluded that there was insufficient proof of a disparate impact on
women. Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 505 F. Supp. 224, 390 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
73. Abraham, 660 F.2d at 819.
74. See supra note 9.
75. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-7-203 (1981). It is interesting to note that the MMLA was
enacted in direct response to an amendment to Montana's constitution guaranteeing equal
rights regardless of sex. The legislature realized that in order to achieve true equality between
the sexes, equal treatment would not always suffice. Female employees could not compete for
employment on the same level as men if they bore the burden from policies denying pregnancy
disability leave. See generally Krieger, supra note 3, at 524-25.
76. 515 F. Supp. 1264 (D. Mont. 1981).
77. Id. at 1266.
78. Id. 1267. But see Homemakers, Inc. v. Division of Ind'l Welfare, 509 F.2d 20 (9th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1063 (1976).
79. Miller- Wohl Co., 515 F. Supp. at 1267.
80. Miller-Wohl Co. v. Comm'r of Labor & Industry, 685 F.2d 1088 (9th Cir. 1982).
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that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction."' Within the Ninth
Circuit, the controversy between state acts and the PDA has been rejuve-
nated in a suit by California Federal Savings and Loan Association challeng-
ing the California law which guarantees adequate leave and reinstatement
rights for disability due to pregnancy.8 2
3. California Prohibition Against Pregnancy Discrimination, California
Government Code § 12945
The California Legislature responded to the Supreme Court's ruling in
Gilbert with the same adamant disapproval as did Congress, but engineered
a different scheme under which its statute would operate.8 3 In an effort to
promote equal employment opportunity,"' the legislature predetermined
that inadequate disability leave does have a disparate impact on pregnant
employees, thereby relieving claimants of the burden to establish disparate
impact discrimination in their prima facie case.85 Such a legislative determi-
nation is permissible under California law where there is a rational relation
between the facts and the presumption. 6 It is incontestable that pregnant
employees require some time off from work. This leads to the presumption
that pregnant employees faced with no-leave policies lose their jobs "because
of" or "on the basis of" their pregnancy.
8 7
81. Id.
82. California Federal, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 562.
83. See Note, Review of Selected 1978 California Legislation, Employment Practices; Preg-
nancy Discrimination, 10 PACIFIC L.J. 461, 463 (1979). See also 123 CONG. REc. 29,642-43
(1977) (discussion by Senator Bayh, co-sponsor of the PDA): "In handing down its decision in
Gilbert, the Court made it clear that if Congress wanted to make sure that discrimination on
the basis of pregnancy was to be considered sex discrimination, it would have to make that
clear by passing legislation so stating. This is precisely what the legislation before us today
does ...."
84. See Price v. Civil Service Comm'n, 26 Cal. 3d 257, 604 P.2d 1365, 161 Cal. Rptr 475,
cert. dismissed, 449 U.S. 811 (1980). The court noted that the state law shares the objectives of
Title VII. Id. at 273, 604 P.2d at 1381, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 490. See also Sterling Transit Co.,
Inc. v. Fair Employment Practice Comm'n, 121 Cal. App. 3d 791, 175 Cal. Rptr. 548 (1981).
85. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12945(b)(2). This section requires employers who do not offer
general disability leave sufficient to suit pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions,
to provide adequate leave for pregnant employees. The Montana legislature predetermined
disparate impact in favor of the pregnant employee. See Krieger, supra note 3, at 523-524. To
contrast the state statutory design with the PDA, see supra notes 63-68 and accompanying
text.
86. Kirchhubel v. Munro, 149 Cal. App. 2d 243, 249, 308 P.2d 432, 436 (1957). See, e.g.,
Estate of Cornelious, 35 Cal. 3d 461, 465, 674 P.2d 245, 247, 198 Cal. Rptr. 543, 545, appeal
dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 2337 (1984); Burg v. Municipal Court, 35 Cal. 3d 257, 268, 673 P.2d 732,
738-39, 198 Cal. Rptr. 145, 151 (1983), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 2337
(1984).
87. This result is prohibited by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h).
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Specifically, Section 12945(b)(2) requires employers to provide pregnant
employees with a reasonable disability leave of up to four-months. The stat-
utory language defines a "reasonable leave" as that time during which the
employee is actually disabled.88 The need for a four-month requirement is
substantiated by evidence that on the average, pregnant employees granted
disability leave utilize 15.1 weeks.89 Even with the four month requirement
the statute is not overinclusive because pregnant employees able to return to
work sooner must do so in order to preserve their rights under the law.' In
The Matter of the Accusation of the Department of Fair Employment and
Housing v. Travel Express, the Fair Employment and Housing Commission
for the State of California interpreted this entitlement to a reasonable preg-
nancy disability leave as necessarily guaranteeing employees affected by
pregnancy reinstatement rights to the same or an equivalent position.9" The
department's proposed administrative regulation goes further by creating a
rebuttable presumption that while the employee is on pregnancy leave her
employer is able to leave her job open, or fill it with a temporary replace-
ment.92 The employer may rebut with a showing of business necessity.93
Both Connecticut and Montana have laws similar to California Govern-
ment Code § 12945(b)(2) which require employers to take affirmative steps
in order to provide pregnant employees with equal opportunities in employ-
ment.94 At first blush, these laws appear to contradict the literal wording of
the PDA.95 In California Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Guerra,
the district court declared California's prohibition against pregnancy dis-
crimination invalid for this reason.96 The Ninth Circuit, however, was per-
88. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945(b)(2).
89. S. REP. No. 95-995, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 29,651 (1977) (The Amer-
ican Counsel of Life Insurance conducted a survey of one hundred eighteen companies and
submitted the results to the Senate Human Resources Committee during its deliberations on
the PDA).
90. See supra note 10. See also Proposed Regulation § 7291.2(c)(2)(C) reprinted in 34
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 570.
91. Case No. FEP 80-81, A7-09925 (1984) (cited in 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at
566). Accord Proposed Regulation § 7291.2(c)(2)(B) reprinted in 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) at 569-70. The "same position" is defined as one "with the same pay, working condi-
tions, benefits and opportunities for advancement. . . . Substantially similar job is defined as
one of equal pay and benefits which is performed under similar working conditions, and pro-
vides similar opportunities for advancement." Proposed Regulation § 7291.2(b)(7), reprinted
in 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 569.
92. Id
93. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945. See also Proposed Regulation § 7291.2(c)(2)(C), re-
printed in 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 570. The same defense is available under Title
VII. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. See also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(c) (1984).
94. California Federal, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 568.
95. See supra note 7.
96. California Federal, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 568.
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suaded by the argument supporting an application of the disparate impact
theory in pregnancy discrimination suits. 9"
II. CALIFORN IA FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION V. GUERRA
The district court attacked California's prohibition against pregnancy dis-
crimination on the basis of three findings: (1) that the requirements of the
state law are inconsistent with both the congressional purpose in enacting
the PDA and with the goal of Title VII; (2) that the state law, by mandating
preferential treatment for female employees, conflicts with Title VII; and (3)
that discrimination against male employees due to pregnancy is discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex. 98 The district court opinion gives almost no consid-
eration to the historical development of the PDA and provides little
discussion of the rationale for its legal conclusions.
A. Conflict in Purpose
A state law is invalid under the Supremacy Clause if it conflicts with the
purpose of a federal statute.99 The basis for the district court's conclusion
that California Government Code § 12945(b)(2) is inconsistent with Title
VII stems from its interpretation of Congress' goal in enacting the federal
law. The court suggested that the purpose of Title VII is "to provide equal
treatment for males and females."''" This finding ignores use of the dispa-
rate impact theory under Title VII. The Supreme Court has consistently
construed the goal of Title VII as a guarantee of equal opportunity in em-
ployment, regardless of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. °0 To
achieve this goal, Griggs and its progeny have reaffirmed the theory that an
employment practice which treats males and females equally, may in effect
deny equal employment opportunity, and thereby violate Title VII if the
practice has a disparate impact on one sex and is not justified by a business
necessity.I°2
Prior to 1976, both the EEOC and the federal appeals courts interpreted
Title VII's prohibition against disparate treatment and disparate impact dis-
crimination to extend to pregnant employees. 1oa When the issue reached the
Supreme Court in Gilbert and Satty, a plurality of the bench decided that
treating pregnant employees differently from others did not constitute sex
97. California Federal, 758 F.2d at 396.
98. California Federal, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 568.
99. See supra note 35.
100. California Federal, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 568.
101. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
103. See supra note 50.
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discrimination in employment.' °4 Congress responded by amending Title
VII to specifically include prohibitions "because of" or "on the basis of"
pregnancy5los Congress also included a phrase which provides that pregnant
employees "shall be treated the same . . . as other persons not so affected
but similar in their ability or inability to work."' 0 6 As the district court
stated, Congress' purpose in enacting the PDA was to "eliminate classifica-
tions based on pregnancy,"' 0 7 thereby correcting Supreme Court interpreta-
tions of Title VII to the extent that they denied pregnant women protection
from disparate treatment. Yet, to argue that pregnant employees are not
also protected from disparate impact discrimination, because of the Amend-
ment's wording, is to suggest that Congress, while going overboard to rectify
the Gilbert and Satty problems, intended to grant less protection to pregnant
employees than that available to others.'
The statutory and legislative histories of the PDA clearly refute this prop-
osition. Disparate impact analysis, has been ingrained into Title VII law
since Griggs. 1 Had Congress wanted to limit pregnancy discrimination
victims only to remedies for disparate treatment, it certainly would have
expressed such an intent. Congress chose instead to revise Title VII, not by
adding a new substantive provision dealing with pregnancy, but by inserting
a definitional amendment clarifying that discrimination on the basis of sex
includes discrimination on the basis of 'pregnancy." 0 During the Senate de-
bate on the PDA, Senator Javits, who co-sponsored the bill, explained:
This legislation does not represent a new initiative in employment
discrimination law, neither does it attempt to expand the reach of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 into new areas of employ-
ment relationships. Rather, this bill is simply corrective legisla-
tion, designed to restore the law with respect to pregnant women
employees to the point where it. was last year, before the Supreme
Court's decision in [Gilbert] . .. .II
Even the Supreme Court had recognized in Gilbert and Satty that (the pre-
PDA) Title VII afforded protection to pregnant women when a policy had a
104. See supra discussion of Gilbert and Satty.
105. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(l)(k). See also supra note 63 and accompanying text.
106. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(l)(K).
107. California Federal, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 568.
108. See also California Federal, 758 F.2d at 395 ("Attributing to Congress an intent that
employers or states must ignore pregnancy completely when fashioning their disability policies
would be as absurd as discovering a congressional intent that states or employers must com-
pletely ignore prostatitis on pain of violating Title VII").
109. See supra note 37.
110. See supra notes 34, 64 and accompanying text.
111. 123 CONG. REC. 29,387 (1977). See also 123 CONG. REC. 29,647 (1977) (remarks of
Senator Williams).
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disparate impact on female employees.' 12 Senator Javits' statement under-
scores an intent to retain this protection. In addition, the EEOC's pre-Gil-
bert interpretive guideline of Title VII protections for pregnant employees
was reissued after Congress passed the PDA. The guideline provides in per-
tinent part:
Where the termination of an employee who is temporarily disabled
[due to pregnancy] is caused by an employment policy under
which insufficient or no leave is available, such a termination vio-
lates the Act if it has a disparate impact on employees of one sex
and is not justified by business necessity.113
The House and Senate Committee Reports accompanying the PDA ex-
pressed full agreement with the EEOC's position.'
14
Within the California law is a finding that an employment policy which
provides inadequate leave has a disparate impact on female employees.
Based on this finding, the law requires employers to provide disability leave
of up to four months for employees affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions." 5 This provision places pregnant women in par-
ity with other employees. The state law fosters the objectives of Title VII as
amended by the PDA--equal opportunity in employment." 6 Thus, Califor-
nia Government Code § 12945(b)(2) does not contradict either Congress'
purpose in enacting the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, or the goal of Title
VII.
B. Conflict in Operation
A state law may still be invalid under the Supremacy Clause if, through its
operation, it prevents compliance with the federal law.' The district court
concluded in California Federal that because the California prohibition on
pregnancy discrimination compels preferential treatment for female employ-
ees disabled by pregnancy, an employer cannot comply under the law with-
out violating Title VII's mandate to treat pregnant employees the same as
employees disabled other than by pregnancy."' The court's conclusion em-
112. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 137; Satty, 434 U.S. at 142.
113. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(c).
114. S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 2,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4748. The Court accords great deference
to the EOOC's interpretations of Title VII. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433-434. See also supra note 67
accompanying text.
115. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12945(b)(2).
116. See supra note 84.
117. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
118. California Federal, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 568.
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bodies its assumption that the PDA does not protect employees from dispa-
rate impact discrimination.
This assumption is unwarranted. Aside from the statutory structure and
legislative history evidencing integration of disparate impact analysis into
the PDA," 9 an extensive reading of the statute's language compels the same
conclusion. 120 There are two segments to the PDA. The first calls for sub-
stitution of the term "pregnancy" for the term "sex" in § 2003-2(a) of Title
42 of the U.S. Code, making it a Title VII violation to "(I) discriminate
against any individual with respect to [her] privileges of employment, be-
cause of [her] . . . [pregnancy;] or (2) to deprive any individual of employ-
ment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect [her] status as an employee,
because of [her] . . . [pregnancy] .. .2.'1'
The language of subsection (1) would preclude the Supreme Court's inter-
pretation in Gilbert. There, the employer's insurance plan included disabili-
ties shared by female and male employees (i.e., broken bones); it also covered
male-specific disabilities (i.e., vasectomies) and female-specific disabilities
(i.e., mastectomies) but the plan excluded medical insurance coverage for
pregnancy-related disabilities. 122 In essence, the package covered disabilities
that only men suffer but eliminated from coverage the primary disability
unique to women, pregnancy. This constitutes discrimination against an in-
dividual with respect to her privileges of employment because of her preg-
nancy, and is a violation under § 2000e-2(a)(1) of Title VII.
Under the language of subsection (2), an employee affected by pregnancy,
childbirth or related medical conditions who loses her job because of an em-
ployment policy which provides inadequate disability leave, has had her
"status as an employee" adversely affected because of her pregnancy. The
D.C. Circuit, dealing with the ten-day disability leave policy in Abraham,
recognized that "oncoming motherhood was virtually tantamount to dismis-
sal."' 23 California Federal's disability leave policy, like Miller-Wohl's, de-
nies disability leave to an employee who has not been with the company for a
minimum length of time.' 24 With respect to these policies too, oncoming
motherhood is virtually tantamount to dismissal. Thus, the first phrase of
119. See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
120. See California Federal, 758 F.2d at 396.
121. See supra note 64 for a complete reconstruction of the statute's text.
122. See supra note 54.
123. Abraham, 660 F.2d at 819. See also supra note 73 and accompanying text.
124. See California Federal, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 566 (an employee must
have completed the third month of employment to be eligible for disability leave); Miller- Wohl,
515 F. Supp. at 1265, vacated, 685 F.2d 1088 (1982) (employees were denied sick leave during
their first year with the company).
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the PDA protects female employees affected by pregnancy from disparate
treatment and from disparate impact discrimination.
The second phrase of the PDA provides:
[W]omen affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical con-
ditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related pur-
poses, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs,
as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inabil-
ity to work ... 125
Had Congress inserted this phrase in order to require equal treatment of all
employees, it would have effectively invalidated the first phrase of the PDA,
the second part of which declares unlawful those policies which do extend
equal treatment but which have a disparate impact on women. Instead, the
second phrase should be read to safeguard the protection granted in the defi-
nitional phrase, by making it clear that the PDA entitles pregnant employees
to the same treatment which Title VII affords to all other victims of discrim-
ination-protection from disparate treatment and from disparate impact dis-
crimination. 126 The second phrase of the PDA cannot be read at face value
in light of the judicial and legislative history predate its passage.
127
The spirit of the law is no less important than its letter. In holding that
affirmative action is permissible, notwithstanding the strict wording of Title
VII which prohibits racial discrimination in employment, the Supreme
Court stated that it is a "familiar rule that a thing may be within the letter of
the statute and not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor
within the intention of its maker."' 128 The purpose of Title VII is to guaran-
tee equal employment opportunity.' 29 A strict reading of the second phrase
of the PDA would only defeat such a purpose.
Once the PDA is construed to prohibit disparate impact discrimination,
there is no conflict between the operation of California Government Code §
12945(b)(2) and Title VII. The California law requires an employer to give
pregnant employees up to four months disability leave with reinstatement
rights to their original or a similar position."3 Title VII does not mandate
these benefits but does prohibit policies which, although facially neutral,
have a disparate impact on women.' 31 An employer who provides inade-
quate disability leave and denies reinstatement to pregnant employees may
125. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
126. See California Federal, 758 F.2d at 396.
127. See supra notes 48-69 and accompanying text.
128. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979).
129. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429.
130. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12945(b)(2).
131. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-30 (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2)). The House
Report specifically acknowledges the Montana and Connecticut laws which are similar to Cali-
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be enforcing a policy prohibited under Title VII. The policy burdens male
and female employees as to non-gender-related disabilities equally. How-
ever, it imposes an additional burden on women because having children is a
capability unique to the female sex. Where one half of the labor force is
composed of women and four out of every five become pregnant during their
working lives,' 32 inadequate disability leave policies inevitably impose a dis-
parate impact on female employees. An employer who grants adequate
leave but, as did California Federal, does not guarantee reinstatement, in
effect provides no leave at all. Both policies subject female employees to the
disparate impact discrimination prohibited since Griggs. '33
Rather than leaving this step to the claimant in establishing her prima
facie case, the California law takes notice of the disparate impact, orders the
appropriate remedy, and leaves to the courts only the adjudication of the
employer's business necessity defense. Title VII may also require an em-
ployer to grant adequate pregnancy disability leave and reinstatement rights,
but only after a court has taken judicial notice of the disparate impact result-
ing from an inadequate leave policy. Both methods achieve the same re-
sult--equal employment opportunity.
The district court in California Federal concluded that the California law
mandated preferential treatment for women and therefore violated Title
VII.' 34 Yet prohibiting disparate impact discrimination is, in many in-
stances, equivalent to requiring a form of preferential treatment which
brings the disadvantaged group in parity with others. When the Supreme
Court found in Satty that a denial of seniority upon return from disability
leave adversely impacted on female employees affected by pregnancy, 3 5 the
employer was left with two options: allow an employee returning from preg-
nancy disability leave to retain her seniority status while denying this right
to others, or extend the right to all employees.
The first alternative, preferential treatment, was accepted by the Supreme
Court in Dothard v. Rawlinson. '36 There the lower court barred the em-
ployer from applying a facially neutral policy to those employees adversely
affected by it. The Supreme Court approved this as an appropriate remedy
under Title VII. ' 7 Furthermore, the House Report accompanying the PDA
fornia Gov't Code § 12945(b)(2). The report predates enactment of California's law. HouSE
REPORT, supra note 4, at 11, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4759.
132. See supra note 3.
133. See supra note 37.
134. California Federal, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 568.
135. Satty, 434 U.S. at 141.
136. 433 U.S. at 331.
137. Id.
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confirms that preferential treatment of female employees affected by preg-
nancy is permitted, although not mandated, by Title VII.1 38 This report
states that an employer who does not provide benefits such as paid sick leave
to his employees is not required to provide them for pregnant employees.' 39
However, the employer may select certain benefits to offer pregnant workers
without granting the same to all employees. 4 This form of preferential
treatment is the better alternative for an employer in some situations.
For example, the employer who does not guarantee reinstatement to em-
ployees who need extended disability leaves faces this situation. Once a
court holds that the denial of reinstatement has a disparate impact on wo-
men, the employer has two choices: (1) guarantee women affected by preg-
nancy reinstatement to the same or similar job if they return from disability
leave within a reasonable period; or (2) grant reinstatement rights to all em-
ployees who return from any disability leave within the specified time allot-
ment. The second option places the employer in a difficult position; he must
leave positions open and utilize temporary employees even in the case of an
individual employee who, due to a particular disability, will probably never
be able to return to work. Extension is not always the better solution, but it
is certainly permissible.
The district court in Miller- Wohl suggested that the company should ex-
tend benefits to non-pregnant employees if it is concerned about Title VII
violations.' 4 ' A state law requiring that certain benefits be granted to preg-
nant employees, then, would not conflict with Title VII because compliance
with both laws is not a practical impossibility.' 42 The district court in Cali-
fornia Federal responded to this contention by concluding that "an employer
need not extend preferential treatment to all similarly situated employ-
ees.' 143 The court cited authority in Homemakers, Inc. v. Division of Indus-
trial Welfare,'" where the state statute required employers to pay premium
overtime pay to women only, in order to lessen the current pay dissimilari-
ties of male and female employees.' 4  The court rejected extending this re-
quirement to male employees as a method of correcting the otherwise
discriminatory statute, because such a remedy would defeat the purpose of




141. Miller-Wohl, 515 F. Supp. at 1266.
142. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
143. California Federal, 34 Fair Empi. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 568.
144. Id.; Homemakers, 509 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1063 (1976).
145. Id. at 1112.
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the law.' 4 6 In Miller-Wohl, however, the extension of disability leave and
reinstatement rights to all employees would have preserved the legislature's
intent-the removal of a burden from which female employees uniquely
suffer.
C. Sex Discrimination
A final argument presented in the California Federal district court deci-
sion is that the Section 12945(b)(2) discriminates against male employees,
which is discrimination on the basis of sex.147 Title VII prohibits state laws
which "require or permit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful
employment practice under this title." If the state law requires employers to
discriminate on the basis of sex as to male employees, then it is invalid under
Title VII.
The lower court in Miller- Wohl found no such violation in Montana's Ma-
ternity Leave Act, which is similar to California's law.' 4 The Miller- Wohl
court found that Montana's law allowed an employer to treat equally male
and female employees who are similarly disabled, and only barred employers
from burdening female employees because of their different role in giving
birth to children. "9 Therefore, Section 12945(b)(2), which denies a benefit
to male employees which they will never need, cannot discriminate against
them because it causes them no harm.
The Ninth Circuit commented that the district court's finding on this issue
"defies common sense, misinterprets case law, and flouts Title VII and the
PDA."' 5 ° That court relied on the analytical difference between a 1983
Supreme Court decision, Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v.
EEOC,15' and Section 12945(b)(2), to support its contention that the PDA
was passed to aid those who need it, women and not men.' 52 In Newport
News the court upheld an order for the employer to extend pregnancy bene-
fits to female spouses of male employees so that the male employee's health
insurance package would be equal to the female employee's package.'
53
There, female employees whose husband-spouses were insured for all disabil-
ities were getting a more comprehensive benefit than male employees whose
wife-spouses were not covered for pregnancy disability. In California Fed-
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148. Miller-Wohl, 515 F. Supp. at 1266.
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151. 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
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eral's case, however, granting a disability leave to pregnant employees causes
no diminution to the benefit package of a male employee who will never
become pregnant.' Therefore, Section 12945(b) (2) has no discriminatory
effect on male employees.
III. CONCLUSION
Title VII, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, guarantees
equal opportunity in employment to female employees affected by preg-
nancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions. California Government
Code § 12945(b)(2), acting under the realm of Title VII, requires employers
to affirmatively comply with the federal statute by granting reasonable disa-
bility leave and reinstatement rights to pregnant employees. The legislative
history of the PDA acknowledges a law similar to California's and the de-
sign of Title VII welcomes state action in this area. Use by state legislatures
of a statutory scheme similar to California Government Code § 12945(b)(2)
will provide better protection for pregnant employees without denying any
rights to males and non-pregnant females. Absent state action, employers
should voluntarily afford disability leave to female employees disabled by
pregnancy.' 55 Otherwise, they may be in violation of Title VII's prohibition
against disparate impact discrimination on the bases of pregnancy, child-
birth, or related medical conditions.
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